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ABSTRACT 
Entrepreneurs in Asian economies face many difficulties in starting up and running their 
businesses. Relationships with government officials help to, e.g., mobilise resources and 
cope with the constraints imposed by bureaucratic structures. In this context, bribery can 
be regarded as an investment that entrepreneurs need to make in order to operate 
successfully in an institutionally weak transition economy. However, not all 
entrepreneurs pay a bribe. In this paper the relationship between demographic 
characteristic and bribery incidence has been investigated. This relationship was 
estimated using unique data derived from a survey of 606 Vietnamese entrepreneurs. The 
author controlled for various organisational and industrial characteristics. The 
exploratory results show that in particular well-educated entrepreneurs are more 
inclined to bribe than others. 
 
Keywords: corruption, work experience, formal education, non-formal education, 
Vietnam 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Many Asian economies show impressive growth rates. Countries such as China, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam all report growth rates of on 
average 8% annually since the 1960s (Wu, 2009). At the same time, these 
countries are consistently rated by agencies such as Transparency International as 
having the highest levels of corruption. This is a paradox because it is widely 
believed that corruption inhibits economic growth and lowers investments 
(Mauro, 1995), distorts competition (Hamra, 2000), increases income inequality 
(Li, Xu, & Zou, 2000), and reduces the levels of other economic drivers of 
growth such as financial debt, foreign trade and human capital (Friedman, 
Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido, 2000). To be sure, many of the Asian countries 
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have announced anti-bribery campaigns and signed international anti-corruption 
agreements. Nonetheless, despite the strong incentives for governments to limit 
corruption, bribery continues to exist (Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, & 
Woodruff, 2000). 
 
During the past decades the number of corruption studies mushroomed. The 
majority of these studies have an empirical, country-level or ''macro'' orientation. 
Macro-level studies typically apply perception indices as measures of corruption. 
These data are publicly available from Transparency International or the World 
Bank. A key aim for the macro-level studies is to understand the effects of 
institutional factors and national policies on corruption (Herzfeld & Weiss, 
2003). This line of research offered helpful explanations for the causes of 
corruption and shows that the openness of an economy, the quality of political 
institutions as well as legal- and cultural roots are key determinants of corruption 
(Treisman, 2007; Wu, 2009).  
 
However, an analysis of country-level data can provide only limited insights of 
bribery at between individual actors or organisations. This lack of understanding 
may explain why it has proven to be so difficult to limit corruption. Recent 
studies therefore attempt to explain the bribery phenomena from a firm-level 
perspective. The assumption is that firms operating within the same country may 
vary in their propensity to pay bribes due to factors specific to firms or their 
perceptions of the environment. Gavira (2002), for instance, shows that 
bureaucratic interference is higher in firms that are more likely to pay bribes (cf. 
Swamy, Knack, Lee, & Azfar, 2001). Clarke and Zu (2004) use firm-level data 
on bribes in 21 transition economies and find that more profitable firms are more 
likely to pay bribes. This aligns with the findings of Svensson (2003) who tested 
similar firm-level hypotheses on the incidence and magnitude of bribes paid by 
176 Ugandan firms (cf. Mocan, 2008). In a similar vein, Chen, Yaşar and Rejesus 
(2008) combine firm-level variables with macro-level indicators using 
information from approximately 3000 companies in 55 nation states. Among 
others, they show that firm characteristics and the business environment affect a 
firm's decision to bribe. 
 
The firm-level line of research is valuable because it shifted the attention away 
from the demand side of corruption (i.e., the government) towards the supply side 
of bribery (i.e., the firm). Most policy discussions focus on public officials who 
are assumed to initiate bribery, which is not always the case. Notwithstanding the 
valuable insights that derive from the firm-level research, it still leaves many 
questions unaddressed because it does not account for the individual that 
performs the bribery activity. In a small-business setting, individuals are the 
entrepreneurs that represent an organisation. An individual-level of analysis is 
important because many companies are (very) small or medium-sized 
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organisations where one person dominates the company, for example, because 
(s)he is the (co-)owner. Understanding the actor-specific dimension of bribery 
may be important as guidance for developing effective policies to reduce bribery. 
 
Consequently, this paper studied the supply-side of bribery in a business setting 
within an Asian economy. It has been noted that the level and incidence of 
corruption not only varies across nation states but also within a particular 
country. Within-country studies of bribery are rare because of, among others, a 
lack of appropriate data. The objective is to fill this research gap. The points of 
departure for this study are threefold. First, in a business setting, bribery is a 
strategic tool that companies may use to overcome bottlenecks that may 
otherwise be experienced in Asian economies. That is, the intention of bribery is 
to avoid or reduce taxes, to bypass laws and regulations, to secure public 
procurement, to overcome long waiting times for particular licenses or permits, or 
to ensure public services such as electricity or telephone connections (Peng & 
Zhou, 2005). Second, bribery is a complex game. Very often the rules of the 
game, the player(s) and the pay-offs are unknown. As a result, an entrepreneur 
must learn how to pay the right amount of money to the right person at the right 
time. Third, not all entrepreneurs pay bribes. Entrepreneurs are different and 
typically vary in their levels of education and work experience. It is the key aim 
of this study to understand whether variation in these demographic characteristics 
determines variation in bribery.  
 
The paper proceeds with a review of the literature on bribery determinants. Then 
hypotheses that are subsequently tested with data from a business survey of 606 
entrepreneurs in Vietnam are presented. The final section concludes the study. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
During the past decades, different fields of research studied the corruption 
phenomenon offering a wealth of explanations for bribery. From an economic 
perspective, for example, bribe-paying behaviour by firms can be considered as a 
rational market response aimed to adjust government failure or weak institutional 
structures that hamper entrepreneurship (Méon & Sekkat, 2005). Bribing 
behaviour is primarily driven by an efficiency-enhancing mechanism which 
explains that firms are willing to pay bribes in order to speed-up bureaucratic 
processes (Lui, 1985). From an organisational perspective it is suggested that 
internal antecedents (such as ownership structure and business integrity) and 
external antecedents (such as poor quality of public services) drive bribery (Luo 
& Han, 2009). Strategic management perspectives emphasize the conditions of 
outside pressures such as the scarcity of resources. A lack of resources explains 
why firms use corruption to adapt an organisation to situations of uncertainty and 
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secure firm survival (McKendall & Wagner, 1997). Ethical perspectives stress 
the importance of anomie theory (Martin, Cullen, Johnson, & Parboteeah, 2007). 
Anomie theory explains that firms use deviant alternatives when legal means to 
achieve goals fail.  
 
To date, an overall theory of corruption does not exist and empirical results of 
bribery determinants are mixed. Macro-level studies suggest that the likelihood 
of bribes paid by firms depend on the legal attributes, cultural characteristics, the 
level of human capital and the institutional characteristics of a country (Chen et 
al., 2008). These determinants are valuable for international studies but obviously 
have no explanatory power for country studies. For country studies, industry 
analyses suggest that the control power of public officials and bargaining power 
of firms are central stage. Control rights theory argues that in an existing 
regulatory system public officials have discrete decision-making power to 
execute laws and enforce rules. Their decisions on licenses, permissions and 
taxes affect firms (Svensson, 2003). The theory also suggests that control rights 
may differ across sectors and locations. That is, the higher the discretional power 
over firms in a specific sector, the more likely public officials will choose to 
work in those sectors because it may create more opportunities for bribery 
demands. The bargaining theory argues that the bargaining power of firms 
depends on firm's ability to pay bribes and the firm's refusal power or the cost of 
not paying bribes. That is, the likelihood that a firms pays bribes will be 
positively related with the (expected, future) profits and a negatively with the 
expected alternative return to capital. 
 
Futhermore, the empirical literature on corruption indicates that individual (actor-
specific) characteristics can explain variation in bribes across firms. Guerrero and 
Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008), for example, find that men are more prone to corrupt 
behavior than women. In a similar vein, Swamy et al. (2001) suggest that women 
on average are less tolerant of corruption. Gatti, Paternostro and Rigolini (2003) 
find that employed, less wealthy, and older people appear to be more averse to 
corruption. Among other reasons, it is suggested that older people are less prone 
to corruption because they are less involved in bureaucratic procedures in daily 
life (Cabelkova & Hanousek, 2004). Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008) 
suggest that the higher a person's education level, the more likely (s)he will pay a 
bribe. They argue that education is a proxy for opportunity costs and that the 
higher the opportunity costs, the higher the probability of paying a bribe.  
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This study focuses on the incidence of bribe payouts by entrepreneurs. While it is 
difficult to observe an official's control rights over firms it is possible to 
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determine whether or not an entrepreneur (a firm) bribed an official. Thus, the 
dependent variable in this case is binary variable that equals 1 if an entrepreneur 
(a firm) pays a bribe and zero otherwise. I argue that in a small business setting 
individual attributes may affect bribery incidence. The focus on entrepreneurial 
attributes makes sense because in small firms the entrepreneur makes choices on 
the basis of perceptions of a particular problem or context. Thus, the aim is to 
analyse to what extent personal characteristics of entrepreneurs affect bribery 
incidence (Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2005). It is a question which entrepreneurial 
characteristics matter. The selection of characteristics is embedded in the 
literature on entrepreneurship (Casson, 2010). These theories suggest that the 
choices that entrepreneurs make inherently reflect their educational background 
and their work experience. In what follows, the hypotheses that relate these 
characteristics to bribery incidence will be specified. 
 
Work experience is the first demographic characteristic. Management literature 
emphasizes the importance of work experience for the design of a firm's strategy 
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Canella, 2009). Entrepreneurs with much experience 
tend to place more weight on the process of developing formal strategies than 
those who lack relevant managerial experience (Karami, Analoui, & Kakabadse, 
2006). Experience might influence the likelihood of bribery because more 
mobile, short-tenured entrepreneurs are more likely to engage in high-risk 
activities such as bribery. Work experience is associated with moral 
development, deliberateness in decision-making, and more accurate diagnosis of 
information. Work experience allows entrepreneurs to develop more (tacit) 
knowledge about corruption or particular experience with bribery as well as 
adequate shared information through social networks (Lam, 2000). This may 
increase bribe efficacy, reduce the risk of being asked for bribes, increase the 
ability to understand optimal levels of bribes per particular event, or to develop 
competencies that increase bribe refusals. For that reason, entrepreneurs with 
much work experience are expected to engage less likely in bribery activities. 
Hence, the hypothesis is: 
 
 H1:  There is a negative relationship between work experience and the  
   likelihood to pay bribes. 
 
The level of formal education is the second demographic characteristic. Formal 
education refers to knowledge that is obtained in primary or secondary schools, 
technical colleges or universities (Eshach, 2007). Formal learning environments 
are formally structured in which learning occurs when knowledge is transferred 
from teachers to students within a systematic educational setting (Gerber, Marek, 
& Cavallo, 2001). In such settings, attendance typically is obligatory, topics are 
guided by teachers, motivation is primarily extrinsic, and learning outcomes 
explicitly evaluated (Tamir, 1991). 
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The effects of formal education on cognitive abilities is a key subject of research 
in developmental psychology (Haynie & Shepherd, 2009). The level of formal 
education measures an individual's knowledge and competence base (Hitt & 
Tyler, 1991). Formal education positively affects an individual's cognitive ability 
such as open-mindedness and a receptivity to innovation (Becker, 1970), strategic 
choice and firm performance (Usai, Delmestri, & Montanari, 2001). Wally and 
Baum (1994), for example, find that the amount of formal education for 
executives is positively associated with a measure of cognitive complexity or the 
ability to interpret patterns and differentiate among subjects. Therefore, managers 
with high levels of formal education are expected to generate a wide range of 
creative solutions and rational decisions when facing with complex problems 
(Bantel & Jackson, 1989). Well-educated managers are known as persons who 
can see and capture market alternatives better than low-educated managers 
because of their superior awareness levels, information processing capabilities, 
productivity and decision-making skills (Barros & Alves, 2003). For that reason a 
negative relationship between formal education and bribery incidence are 
expected. This hypothesis is in line with macro-level studies that have found that 
countries with higher levels of education are positively correlated with lower 
figures of corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Mocan, 2008). This correlation, in 
turn, has been interpreted as proof that education decreases corruption supported 
by the argument that a more educated society would be expected to tolerate 
bribes less (Rest & Thoma, 1986). Therefore, the hypothesis is: 
 
 H2: There is a negative relationship between formal education and the  
     likelihood to pay bribes.  
 
Non-formal education is the third demographic characteristic of the entrepreneur. 
Non-formal education is different from informal education. Like formal 
education, non-formal education occurs in a structured system and is usually 
planned; however, it often incorporates more intrinsic motivation than formal 
education and takes place in institutions other than regular schools (Eshach, 
2007). Informal education and non-formal education are more or less similar in 
terms of the voluntary nature and intrinsic motivation. Informal education, 
however, refers to less structured, spontaneous learning in everyday situations. 
 
Non-formal education in this research setting refers to entrepreneurs who actively 
participate in management courses. Attending (short-term) management courses 
allows entrepreneurs to update their business competencies and knowledge 
(Schamp & Deschoolmeester, 1998). The content of business courses, however, 
offers an explanation for a positive effect of non-formal education on bribery 
incidence. It is argued that business education may cause a decline in moral 
development because these programs typically focus on learning competitive 
strategies that stress the importance of free riding, defection and selfishness 
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(Goshal, 2005). Additionally, in Asian economies it has been pointed out that 
education offers opportunities to establish networks. Management courses are 
often attended not only to update knowledge and improve managerial skills but 
also to initiate and develop personal networks. Privileged knowledge is the key 
advantage of a business network. Hence, by attending management courses, 
entrepreneurs may build networks and learn about prevailing norms and practices 
of bribery (Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998). The effect of a social network 
can be pervasive because existing network members might enforce their norms to 
new participants at the threat of exclusion from the network (Cartier-Bresson, 
1997). Ongoing inter-personal ties with government officials to access e.g., 
government contracts manifest opportunities for engaging in bribery transactions 
(Buchan, 2005). Taking the above into account, the hypothesis is: 
 
 H3: There is a positive relationship between non-formal training and the  
      likelihood to pay bribes. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Research context 
 
Among the transitional economies, Vietnam offers an interesting research 
context, for it is an extreme case in its lack of formal market-institutions but it 
reports a robust growth of de novo private firms (Heberer, 2003). The country is 
the third largest transitional economy after China and Russia, with 80% of its 
population of more than 80 million people living in rural areas (Masina, 2006). 
Despite its rich natural resources, Vietnam remains a poor country with per capita 
GDP at US$832 (in 2007). The war for independence against the French 
stretched from the late 1950s to the early 1960s leading to the division of the 
country into North and South. This was soon followed by the war against the 
United States, which continued until the country was reunited in 1975. Under the 
rule of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Vietnam's economy was built on a 
Soviet-style central planning model. This was not successful, and by the mid-
1980s Vietnam was close to bankruptcy after withdrawal of Soviet assistance and 
several years of conflict with China. Prior to the mid-1980s, essentially all 
economic activity in Vietnam was undertaken by state-owned firms or 
cooperatives. The transition to a market economy began in 1986 when a series of 
economic reforms (Doi Moi) were introduced. Most importantly, under state 
supervision, entrepreneurship was encouraged.  
 
Along with other Asian countries, Vietnam has a reputation for bribery; for 
decades it has been among the top ten of the most corrupt countries (World Bank, 
2000). There have been many attempts by the Vietnamese government to limit 
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bribery by means of legislation, sentencing people to long periods in prison or 
even imposing the death penalty (Johnson et al., 2000). Nonetheless, bribery 
continues to exist. There are at least three explanations for the persistence of 
bribery in Vietnam. First, bribery tends to take place in secret; no contracts are 
written, making it hard to detect in the first place (Bardhan, 1997). There are 
many cases were bribery is mutually beneficial, which fosters tacit collusion 
between the participants. Furthermore, policy measures aimed at detecting and 
correcting bribery have to be sustained over long periods of time in order to be 
credible. The campaigns in Vietnam are usually ad hoc and induce bureaucrats to 
direct bribery transactions towards lower-detection activities (McMillan & 
Woodruff, 2002). Also, the content of anti-bribery regulations in Vietnam is often 
of a low quality and complex. The resulting difference between ''law on paper'' 
and ''law in reality'' has often created more rather than fewer opportunities for 
bribery. Second, those who complain may, in turn, become the subject of 
retaliatory measures themselves. Many Vietnamese do not feel guilty about their 
own personal attempt at bribery (Masina, 2006). Close family and business 
structures (Guanxi) are an integral part of Vietnamese society. It is widely 
accepted that these social relationships have to be fostered through favours, gifts 
or hospitality such as invitations to restaurants or karaoke bars. Those who 
oppose bribery become outcasts in a society where bribery has become an ever-
present and ''legal'' phenomenon that extends throughout all areas of life 
(Heberer, 2003). Third, Vietnam is a growing and strongly decentralised 
economy. It is a state with an advanced system of permits and licenses that 
especially affects entrepreneurs because their activities need government 
approval. As the economy expands and becomes more complex, public officials 
see more opportunities to make money (Bardhan, 1997). Different agencies, 
ministries and local governments have broad autonomy to introduce their own 
regulations. Subsequently, they all set their own bribes in order to maximise their 
own revenues. Hence, bribery also persists due to a decentralised local 
government with badly trained and poorly paid bureaucrats who operate in a 
poorly developed institutional framework and use all power at their discretion to 
maximise their income. 
 
Sample  
 
In Vietnam, secondary data can be easily collected for each province; using local 
administrative offices such as those concerned with statistics, investment and tax, 
but these data are often aggregated and thus are not applicable at the firm level. 
For this reason, the key activities of this research project included the design and 
implementation of a large-scale business survey to collect firm-level information. 
Such business surveys are rare in Vietnam. One of the implications is that 
business managers will not be used to providing confidential business 
information to outsiders or to providing opinions on Likert-scale-rated questions 
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(see, e.g., Aidis & van Praag (2007) for a list of similar challenges). This study 
applied a dataset from 2004. 
 
This research proceeded in three stages. In the preparatory phase of the 
fieldwork, an existing business questionnaire has been revised (Le, 2003), 
discussing it with researchers and business practitioners, and consulting other 
business questionnaires. Next, several pilot surveys were implemented in two 
provinces of the Mekong River Delta, namely, Can Tho and Kien Giang. This 
resulted in a number of modifications to the questionnaire. The final 
questionnaire contained 35 questions that offered us rich information to measure 
the constructs. Additionally, I also learned that personal interviews would be the 
best strategy for collecting firm-level data in Vietnam. The reason for this was 
two-fold. First, given the sensitive nature of some of the questions (e.g., bribery), 
a very high level of non-response from a mail survey was expected (computerised 
surveys via the internet are not a feasible alternative at this moment in Vietnam). 
Personal contacts are pivotal in the Vietnamese (business) culture. Bribery, for 
example, is a well-known phenomenon and to some extent a subject for debate 
but then only in a personal conversation. Second, while secondary data first 
provided us with a list of private firms, the reliability of this data are doubted due 
to the fact that it was not up-to-date, especially with respect to the number of 
newly established firms, mergers or changes of ownership type. Therefore, it was 
decided that a personal interview with business managers would be the best 
strategy in order to collect the required data in Vietnam. 
 
In the second stage, a team of interviewers was trained, consisting of teachers and 
students from the School of Economics and Business Administration, Can Tho 
University, Vietnam. The selected interviewers were required to have experience 
in conducting surveys. The interviewers have been trained on the key topics of 
the survey. They also have to aware of the importance of the data they would be 
collecting for the university, with the intention of motivating the interviewers to 
take personal responsibility for the data collection as a means of improving data 
quality. The interviewers were generally younger than the participants and hence, 
not a threat for the entrepreneurs. In addition, the interviews were conducted in 
the local dialect of Vietnamese, which interviewees respond to more easily, 
making their answers more precise. In the third stage, intensive interviews with 
entrepreneurs of 606 firms identified in six out of the thirteen provinces of the 
Mekong River Delta (one of which had recently been reclassified) has been 
conducted. The reason to concentrate only on the Mekong River Delta was 
because it has shown a significant increase in the number of private firms in 
recent years. Additionally, the key role of private firms in this region contributes 
greatly to the GDP of the entire country. The six provinces were Kien Giang, An 
Giang, Dong Thap, Can Tho, Vinh Long and Soc Trang. Because of cost 
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efficiency reasons, we concentrated the efforts on these six provinces; the density 
of firms is the greatest in these provinces. 
 
A sample was not selected prior to the interviews; rather, the sample was selected 
on the basis of those entrepreneurs willing to cooperate. The interviewees were 
either the owners or the persons who directly managed the company, defined as 
entrepreneurs. If the prospective interviewees agreed, the interview will be 
started, whereas if they refused we apologized and proceeded to the next firm. 
The questionnaire was conducted only if the owner was available to answer 
personally in order to obtain complete and correct information. If the prospective 
interviewees were absent, left the questionnaire and returned having made a new 
appointment. At the start of the interview, the interviewers showed their 
university employee card and an introduction letter from the Dean of the 
university that, among other things, ensured full anonymity of the company and 
information provided. During the interview, the main topics, such as work 
experience, education, and industry context, were discussed. Some extra 
questions were added to invigorate the interview and to enable the respondents to 
tell their own story to some extent. 
 
This approach resulted in a satisfactory response rate. Approximately 1000 
prospective firms have been contacted, and then obtained 606 useable responses. 
Occasionally this sample included missing observations for particular items. For 
the regression analysis, all observations with missing values on any questionnaire 
item has been deleted. This resulted in a conservative dataset with 395 full 
observations, giving an effective response rate of approximately forty percent. 
This response rate is considered to be adequate for analysis and reporting (Aidis 
& van Praag, 2007). The reasons for not participating in the survey included not 
wishing to disclose information, being too busy or feeling uncomfortable when 
being asked about their business. The interviewers were not able to collect 
information from the non-respondents. Often survey research collects data from 
secondary data sources on simple but key characteristics, such as firm size or 
turnover, and applies bivariate tests to determine whether significant differences 
between the sample and non-respondents exist. This information was not 
available, and for that reason sample bias tests could not be performed. Although 
this contributes to the exploratory nature of this research, the quality of the 
survey, the interview process and the substantial number of respondents ensures 
sufficient confidence in the quality of the dataset (for an extensive discussion on 
related methodological issues in entrepreneurship research (see, e.g., Coviello & 
Jones, 2004). 
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Control Variables 
 
Two sets of control variables are included (Zahra et al., 2005). The first set 
concerns firm characteristics, that is, firm age, firm size and the firm's type of 
ownership. The size of a company is a proxy for a firm's bargaining power. Small 
and medium-sized firms are more likely to pay a bribe than their larger 
counterparts because large companies can use their resources to influence public 
officials are pursue legal action. In addition, older firms are presumed to have 
different concerns regarding survive ability than younger firms. It stands to 
reason that young private firms are more likely to pay bribes than established 
companies because bribes help to develop a network of relationships with 
government officials, which, in turn, helps to overcome ''liabilities of newness''. 
The ownership structure may influence the likelihood of bribery as well. For 
instance, with substantial ownership of cash-flow rights, sole proprietorship 
provides the incentive and power to undertake actions that will benefit the owner 
at the expense of the firm's performance. In contrast, firms with shareholders are 
presumed to evaluate investments using market-value rules that maximise the 
value of the firm's residual cash flows (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). The second set 
concerns the industry context. Firms in new, expanding industries operate under 
more challenging conditions than those operating in old, declining industries (in 
Vietnam, the new industries are predominantly service-related, which are usually 
more relationship-intensive and rely more on external resources). The final 
control variable was the level of competition. Some firms operated in emerging 
markets, that is, in new markets characterised by modest competition due to low 
demand and high uncertainty, since potential customers are often unfamiliar with 
the products and services offered (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Others 
operated in growth markets that were characterised by severe competition due to 
high rates of entry. The level of competition takes into account external pressures 
that may offer incentives for bribery so as to escape from these pressures. 
 
Estimation Method 
 
A (logit) binary choice model has been used to empirically test the hypotheses 
(cf. Chen et al., 2008) while controlling for individual characteristics, 
organisational characteristics, and opinions about the bureaucratic system. A firm 
has a choice between paying a bribe to public officials or not. From the 
perspective of expected utility maximisation (Svensson, 2003), a firm will pay 
the bribe if the expected utility from this action is greater than the expected utility 
of not paying it. Since the expected utility of paying the bribe is unobservable, 
the difference between the expected utility of paying bribe and not paying the 
bribe have been modelled as follows: 
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y* = β'xi + ε (1) 
 
Where y* is latent unobservable difference in expected utilities. The xi vector 
represents the characteristics of personal ties, networks and control variables 
affecting the likelihood of bribery and the β' vector is the corresponding 
parameters. ε is assumed to have a logistic (logit model) distribution.  
 
The latent variable y* was not been observed, only observe whether a bribe has 
been paid out or not. Thus, the y binary variable can be defined as: 
 
y = 1 if y* > 0 (2) 
 
y = 0 otherwise (3) 
          
         
It follows that, 
 
prob (yi = 1| xi) = prob (ε + β'xi) = F(β'xi) (4) 
 
Where F is the cumulative distribution function of ε (Greene, 2003). The 
probability of observing an event given x is the cumulative density evaluated at 
xiβ'. The logit distribution is given by: 
 
                          prob (yi = 1| xi) = εβ'xi / +εβ'xi Λ (β'xi)  (5) 
 
The logit form has been estimated because I assume a bell-shaped distribution for 
ε that has thicker tails than a standard normal distribution. Maximum likelihood 
(ML) procedure is used to estimate the parameters of the binary choice model.  
  
Measurement 
 
The likelihood of bribery was measured by a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the firm reports to have paid a positive amount of money to government 
officials to conduct their business, and 0 otherwise. The question was asked in 
Vietnamese. The usual forward and backward translation process have been used 
to obtain the English version. The specific question was: ''Monthly, how much 
must your enterprise pay ''to lubricate'' its business affairs''. The expression ''bôi 
trơn'' in the original Vietnamese question literally means, ''to lubricate''. This is a 
colloquial, synonym reference to money paid as bribes at government offices or 
administrative regulators. The closest English equivalent is ''to grease someone's 
palm''. In the survey, ''to lubricate'' was explicitly defined as money spends. The 
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measure does not include other forms of bribery such as gifts that may have 
monetary value as well. The measure is very similar to the ones used by 
Transparency International and the World Bank. Work experience was measured 
by the total number of years the respondent had worked for both the focal firm 
and at other firms (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). Formal education was 
measured by a dummy variable that equalled 1 if a respondent had a university 
degree and 0 otherwise (Aidis & van Praag, 2007). Non-formal education was 
measured by the number of times a respondent had participated in management 
training courses (Aidis & van Praag, 2007). The age of the company was 
calculated by subtracting the year the firm was founded from the current year 
(Goll & Rasheed, 2005). Firm size was measured by the actual number of 
employees who worked frequently for the company in 2004 (Peng & Heath, 
1996). Firm ownership was measured by a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the 
firm was a sole proprietorship, and 0 for otherwise (Gundry & Welsch, 2001). 
The respondents operate in three main industries, namely services, trading and 
manufacturing. Two dummy variables were constructed to account for industry 
differences, that is, one for services (that equals 1 if the firm operates in the 
service sector, and 0 otherwise) and one for trading (that equals 1 if the firm 
operates in the trading sector, and 0 otherwise). Manufacturing was considered as 
the base case in the model and was thus not included. Competition is the final 
control variable in this model. A perceptual measure has been used because, 
among other things, it has been argued that small and medium-sized enterprises 
form their competitive maps based on perceived information and events (Daniels, 
Johnson, & Chernatony, 2002; Hodgkinson, 1997). The respondent's opinion of 
the level of competition in their industry has been asked in this survey. The level 
of (perceived) competition was measured using a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the respondent indicates that the company operates in a sector with a high or very 
high competition level, and 0 otherwise (Lang, Calantone, & Gudmondson, 
1997). 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – ANALYSIS 
 
Means, standard deviations (SDs) and correlations are provided in Table 1. From 
the observations, 75% (297 firms) reported that they did not pay bribes. 
According to the data, for the firms reporting positive bribes, the yearly average 
amount of bribes that firms paid was VND 60.2 million (US$3,815). The average 
payment for all firms including the zero-bribe firm is VND 16.1 million 
(US$1,024). On average, entrepreneurs have 8.05 years of working experience. 
From the observations, 22% (87 firms) obtained a university degree (or above). 
On average, most of entrepreneurs obtain high school degree. The number of 
times a manager had participated, on average, in management training courses is 
1. On average, firm age is 7.66 years. Firm size is, on average, 18.54 employees. 
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Of the observations, 95.4% (377 firms) are (very) small firms. Sole 
proprietorship accounts for 52.4% (207 firms). 16.2% (64 firms) operates in 
service industry while 49.8% (197 firms) operates in trading.  
 
The data from the research has been used to explore the research question, that is, 
to analyse why some entrepreneurs' bribe and some do not. For this, a logit model 
has been estimated to differentiate the bribing and non-bribing firms using data 
on entrepreneurs' personal attributes, firm characteristics, and industry sectors. 
Before running the logit model, this research investigated whether being corrupt 
or not is driven by a different process from the level of corruption given that 
entrepreneurs are corrupt. For this, the Heckman two-step or Tobit-2 procedure 
have been used that includes two submodels: one of which is the probit (or logit) 
and the other OLS is served to explain the amount of bribery. The idea is that if 
the second submodel (OLS) is estimated and the link to the first submodel 
(probit/logit) is ignored, the estimators are not consistent (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2005). The results from the Heckman model, however, show no connection 
between these two stages with insignificant values for the Mills ratio                  
(B = –279.97; n.s. = 0.30). Hence, sample selection issue is thus of less concern 
and thereby logit or probit models are an appropriate choice. Therefore one stage 
approach is continued.  
 
A logit model differentiating bribing and non-bribing firms have been estimated. 
The results are in Table 2. Model 1 includes the control variables. In Model 2 the 
main effects are added to the control variables. Variance inflation factors (VIF) 
did not report multicollinearity between constructs. The max VIF value is 1.80 
and thus far below the threshold value of 10 (Chen et al., 2008).  
 
Table 1 
 Correlations, means and standard deviations (SD) 
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Table 2 
The impact of entrepreneurial characteristics on bribery incidence 
 
In order to check whether the logit model is suitable, the Hosmer-Lemeshow test 
for goodness-of-fit is used. The Hosmer and Lemeshow's goodness-of-fit test 
measures the predicted frequency and observed frequency that should match 
closely, and that the more closely they match, the better the fit. This is confirmed 
in the model (Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 = 5.05; n.s. = 0.75).  
 
The regression results are in Table 2. Model 1 includes the control variables. In 
Model 2 the main effects are added to the control variables. 
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The first column of Table 2 presents the partial change in Y*  
and the corresponding p-values. The second and the third columns illustrate the 
( ) standardised coefficients and the results of the fully standardised 
coefficients for , respectively. The fourth 
column presents the marginal effects. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The contribution to the existing field of corruption research is threefold. First, 
corruption theory has been extent by explaining how personal characteristics 
determined bribery. More in particular, it has been hypothesised that the 
incidence of firm-level bribery is influenced by work experience, formal and non-
formal education. In so doing, the attention shifted away from institutional and 
macro-level variables towards individual traits of entrepreneurs as determinants 
of bribery incidence. Most contemporaneous studies of bribery have an inductive 
nature and use aggregate, country-level data. It goes without saying that this line 
of research has significantly enhanced the understanding of the causes of 
corruption. At the same time, however, I know relatively little about whether and 
how personal attributes of entrepreneurs determine bribery. Therefore it is 
suggested to look beyond organisational characteristics and study characteristics 
of individual leaders in order to come to grips with the enduring business 
corruption phenomenon. Furthermore, while most studies focus on the recipients 
(such as officials), a comprehensive understanding of the suppliers of bribes is 
virtually absent. Hence, existing theories insufficiently account for variation in 
entrepreneurial characteristics that may determine corruption at the organisation 
level. This research aims to fill this gap. 
 
Second, building on a unique dataset of 606 Vietnamese entrepreneurs, bribery at 
the level of the firm can be quantified and the key concepts can be measured. 
Although much anecdotal and case-study evidence of bribery in Vietnam is 
available (Heberer, 2003) they focus on single events and therefore lack the scope 
needed to generalise findings, determine correlations and discuss causalities. This 
study intended to move beyond case-study literature and to collect firm-level 
information for a sample of companies that enabled us to develop a good insight 
into both factual information and subjective interpretations concerning the role of 
bribery in entrepreneurship.  
 
Third, the research points to the importance of education and the likelihood of 
bribery. The positive impact of non-formal education on bribery incidence is in 
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line with the predictions. However, the positive impact of formal education on 
bribery incidence is counterintuitive. I expected that well-educated entrepreneurs 
would see and capture market alternatives other than bribery opportunities better 
and therefore would be less susceptible to bribery demands. Formal education, 
however, may already induce prevailing business norms and network effects that 
materialize in future careers. Whether there is the possible significance of culture 
in practices of corruption may be a good research question for future agenda. 
Additionally, bribery involves uncertainty and ambiguity. Entrepreneurs with 
more formal education are perhaps better able to plan and play bribery games to 
their advantage than others.  
 
This study suffers from several limitations that offer opportunities for future 
research. First, the use of cross-sectional data from Vietnamese entrepreneurs in 
the Mekong River Delta limits the generalisation of the results. Future studies 
could replicate this research not only in other Asian or transition economies but 
also in advanced economies. The dominant perspective suggests that bribery 
typically is a phenomenon of less developed countries. Case-based evidence, 
however, reveals that bribery is omnipresent and that Western entrepreneurs are 
involved in corruption as well. Third, the measure of bribery considers solely the 
payment of cash. The interaction between an entrepreneur and a public official 
may also incorporate other forms of bribery. For example, entrepreneurs may 
indirectly spend money on bribery via e.g., gifts or visits to bars. New data with 
other bribery measures allows us to test the role of different forms of bribery. 
Finally, it is well known that cross-sectional data prevent inter temporal, causal 
analysis of processes that determine the outcomes observed with the use of a 
questionnaire. Future research may search for a longitudinal or panel study that 
incorporates bribery levels over time so that a clearer causality between 
individual preconditions and firm-level corruption may be identified.  
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